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During the legislative session in 1919 when Alabama adopted workers'
compensation, a major debate erupted over the benefit levels proposed in
the bill offered by Senator M. L. Leeth. His bill called for injured workers
to receive 60 percent of their earnings up to a maximum of$17.50per
week. Ben Stroud, the manager of the Alabama Manufacturers and Oper-
ators Association, wrote to theBirmingham Newsthat if such benefits were
adopted "it becomes perfectly clear that the burden on Alabama industry
will be excessive and force them to decline to come under the bill or to
assume a heavy handicap in the approaching struggle for industrial exis-
tence." Pressure from employers led Senator Acker to amend the Leeth bill
by reducing the replacement rate to50percent with a weekly maximum of
$12.00per week. Senator Leeth responded: "If the employers would only
study the proposed act they would find that it is fair and reasonable. The
maximum doesn't amount to so much. It only guarantees to the man
that if he is making$200a month his wife and little children may get$72
of that per month. How degrading it is for a man to be so hardhearted
and selfish that he will say to the employe's [sic] family, that we will not
allow you but $48 per month to educate your children, to pay house rent,
and support your family." Despite Senator Leeth's efforts, Acker's amend-
ment became the basis for benefit levels in Alabama. The rhetoric in Al-
abama typifies the discussions over benefit levels in nearly every state.
Whether the employers' proposed benefit levels or the proposals of labor
leaders carried the day was determined by the relative political strength of
employers and organized labor, by the nature of industry in the state, and
by the extent of political reform movements.1
Benefit levels were particularly important because they determined the
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share of the rents that each group expected to receive from the legislation.
Employers sought to limit benefits by imposing maximums on weekly and
overall accident payments or by trying to force workers to pay a share of
the employers' insurance premiums. Meanwhile, organized labor consis-
tently fought for accident benefits that paid higher percentages of lost
earnings, with no ceilings on weekly benefits and short waiting periods.
Our sense is that insurance companies were generally not a central player
in the benefit debates because the range of benefits discussed would not
have led to significant moral hazard problems that would have affected
their ability to underwrite workers' compensation insurance. The political
negotiations over benefit levels did not stop with the introduction of work-
ers' compensation. Unions continued to apply pressure to raise benefit lev-
els in most states in most legislative sessions throughout the 1910s and
1920s.
The benefit levels sought by various groups of employers and workers
were influenced by their wage rates, accident risk, factors determining the
insurance premiums for workers' compensation, and the extent to which
workers shared in paying the costs of those premiums through wage off-
sets. After considering the demands of lobbying groups, state legislatures,
subject to the governor's veto, ultimately made the final choice. This chap-
ter explores both the economic and political factors that influenced how
workers' compensation benefit levels were determined in the political pro-
cess. Did state legislators focus their attention on the demands of workers,
who were far more numerous than employers and, thus, constituted the
majority of interested voters? Alternatively, were legislators heeding the
demands of organized employer groups, as many labor unions claimed at
the turn of the century? What role did Progressive Era reformers play?
And finally, after workers' compensation was established, how did the
agencies administering workers' compensation influence the level of ben-
efits?
The results of both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that
benefit levels were influenced by all three groups: employers, workers, and
reformers. How workers' compensation benefits varied across states de-
pended on the relative strength of the interest groups and the economic
factors that influenced their demands. Workers succeeded in securing rela-
tively higher benefit levels, all else constant, in states where unions had a
strong following, where political reforms led to party shifts in the state
legislature, and where the workers' compensation system was administered
by a bureaucratic agency. On the other hand, employers in more danger-
ous industries managed to hold benefit levels down, while employers also
held benefit levels in check in states where high-wage workers had de-
manded substantial increases.174Chapter 7
7.1The Large Variation in Workers' Compensation Benefits
Since workers' compensation benefits were determined by state-level
legislation, there was potential for substantial variation in the benefit pa-
rameters that the different state governments chose. To show how the legis-
lative parameters that determined workers' compensation benefits differed
across states and over time, we developed a measure of expected workers'
compensation benefits for each state from the first year the state adopted
a general workers' compensation law through 1930. For each year and
state we computed the present value of the stream of payments a worker or
his family would have received for each of the four categories of industrial
accidents given the particular rules governing workers' compensation in
each state. The index is calculated assuming that the hypothetical worker
in each state earned the national average manufacturing wage and a dis-
count rate of 5 percent. We then calculated a weighted average of the ben-
efit levels across the four types of accidents where the weights, which are
the same for all states and years, are the probabilities that the broad cate-
gory of accident might occur. Thus, the numbers in table 7.1 represent the
expected accident compensation (in constant 1967 dollars) for the hypo-
thetical worker at the end of the year listed. Appendix B provides a de-
tailed description of the benefits calculations and of the variables used to
construct our estimates.
When we make comparisons across states in a particular year, the ex-
pected benefits index summarizes how the workers' compensation param-
eters differed across states because the wage used to calculate each state's
measure is the same. However, cross-time comparisons of the index for the
same state varied from year to year either because of a change in the state's
workers' compensation law, a change in the national average manufactur-
ing wage, or changes in the price level used to deflate the nominal figures.
We used the national average weekly wage in each year to calculate the
expected benefits index because there was a substantial rise in nominal
wages during this period. If we had used a constant wage throughout, the
expected benefits index would not have fully shown the impact of changes
in many of the workers' compensation parameters in various years. For
example, if we had used the low wages of around 1910 to calculate ex-
pected benefits for the 1920s, the expected benefits measures for those
years would be well below the actual levels. If we had used the high wages
circa 1930, some of the states without maximums in the early 191 Os would
have had extraordinarily high benefit levels that would not reflect the ac-
tual payments that workers received during the earlier period.2
Expected benefits varied widely across states within any year. In 1920,
for example, the expected benefits ranged from a low of $22.90 to a high
of $48.70 (in 1967 dollars). The relative position of each state also fluctu-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0The Battles over Benefit Levels, 1910-1930177
high when the states first introduced their laws, but the states provided
fixed benefits to all injured workers, regardless of their wages, so the states'
rankings fell sharply through the latter half of the 191 Os as inflation eroded
the value of the fixed amounts. In most states the rapid increase in wages
during World War I often caused benefit levels to hit statutory maximums,
thus causing the weekly maximum benefit to fall to as low as 25 to 33
percent of the weekly wage.3
After some delay most states raised their maximums between 1919 and
1923. The pattern of benefits in Texas provides a typical example of the
inflationary effects on expected compensation when the states were slow
in raising the benefit ceilings. When the law was first adopted in 1913 it
provided expected benefits valued at $50.93 (in constant 1967 dollars) and
by 1920 inflation had caused expected benefits in that year to fall to
$34.95. Texas did not change the maximum allowable benefit until 1923,
and that legislative change only brought the expected benefits to approxi-
mately the 1913 level, in real terms.
7.2The Political Economy of Benefit Levels
What explains such a wide variation in benefit levels across states and
over time in the early period of workers' compensation? Although the
passage of workers' compensation generally was due to the cooperative
efforts of the various interest groups, contentious disputes nevertheless
persisted between workers and employers over the level of accident bene-
fits. There was a range of benefit levels within which both workers and
employers could gain from the legislation. Benefits had to be high enough
that workers were better insured against workplace accident risk than un-
der negligence liability. On the other hand, employers demanded an upper
limit on benefit levels, in part, to avoid the moral hazard problems that
might undermine their basic reason for shifting to workers' compensa-
tionto reduce accident cost uncertainty. Public testimony and the bills
proposed both by employers' and workers' groups in various states show
clearly that workers sought workers' compensation parameters that led to
higher benefit levels, while employers proposed parameters associated with
much lower levels. The pressure from employers and workers was then
filtered through the legislative process. In this section we describe the fac-
tors that influenced the benefit levels that workers and employers lobbied
for and lay out the potential legislative outcomes.
7.2.1The Employers' Choice of Benefit Levels
While employers generally lobbied for lower benefit levels, their choice
of benefit levels varied in response to a variety of economic constraints.
When employers decided on the benefit levels for which they lobbied state
legislatures, they had to balance the costs of providing such insurance for178Chapter 7
their workers against the gains in the form of increased productivity. The
costs of higher benefit levels were based largely on the insurance premiums
that employers had to pay to obtain workers' compensation coverage.4
Employers also anticipated some gains from higher benefit levels because
better nonwage benefits have often been associated with higher productiv-
ity and lower turnover among workers. Further, employers generally did
not bear the full economic burden of higher benefit levels even though the
employer was required by law to pay all insurance premiums in nearly
every state.5 Nonunion workers often implicitly shared in paying the insur-
ance costs associated with higher benefit levels because employers were
able to pass a portion of the insurance costs on to workers through wage
offsets (see chap. 3).
The preferred benefits of profit-maximizing employers potentially var-
ied in response to a number of factors: the inherent danger of their work-
places, the productivity of their establishments, their size, the nature of
their product market, their ability to pass their insurance costs on to work-
ers through lower wages, and other factors influencing the premiums they
paid for workers' compensation coverage.6
Employers generally sought to reduce the costs of their insurance premi-
ums for workers' compensation coverage. Essentially the portion of the
insurance premium that an employer actually paid could be written as
Premium = (Accident probability) x (Benefits) x (Load factor)
x (Experience-rating parameter)
x (1 - Share workers paid through wage offsets).
Higher benefit levels meant higher premiums. In more dangerous indus-
tries the higher accident risk raised premiums, holding benefit levels con-
stant; therefore, employers had incentives to seek lower benefit levels to
reduce the impact of higher accident risk on their insurance premiums.
Another determinant of the premium was the load factor charged by in-
surers to cover administrative costs, to earn a profit, and to limit problems
with adverse selection.7 In states where insurance regulators allowed work-
ers' compensation insurers to charge higher loads, employers tended to
seek lower benefit levels to reduce the effect of these higher load factors
on their insurance premiums.
The premiums paid for workers' compensation insurance were also in-
fluenced by the effectiveness of experience rating, which was the insurers'
practice of making the employer's workers' compensation premium a
function of the number and severity of accidents in that industry and in
his workplace. If the premiums were not accurately experience rated, then
the premiums that employers with more dangerous workplaces paid would
be subsidized by payments from less dangerous workplaces. In these cases,
employers with more dangerous workplaces might allow for higher benefitThe Battles over Benefit Levels, 1910-1930179
levels because they would not pay the full share of their insurance pre-
mium. Meanwhile, employers with less dangerous workplaces would have
more incentive to push for lower benefit levels.8 Our sense from cross-
industry comparisons of workers' compensation insurance premiums,
however, is that differences in accident risk across industrial classifications
were reasonably well captured by adjustments in the manual rates set for
each industry.9 Within industries, however, experience rating across firms
was less complete (McCahan 1929, 100-118). Studies of modern workers'
compensation and examination of experience-rating formulas in the 1 920s
show that within industries, larger firms are more likely to be experience
rated than smaller firms (Worrall and Butler 1988; Aldrich 1997 99lOO,
153). Thus, if the same sort of relationship held eighty years ago, then
larger firms may have had incentives to keep benefit levels lower than did
smaller firms.
On the other hand, larger firms may have had an incentive to raise bene-
fit levels to the extent that there were economies of scale in preventing
accidents or in obtaining coverage of workers' compensation risk. In such
a setting higher benefits would have raised the workers' compensation
costs of smaller firms relatively more than for larger firms, giving larger
firms a competitive advantage in the final product market. Such an antic-
ompetitive strategy was most effective in settings where the industrial com-
petitors were largely located within the same state. It was much less effec-
tive in settings where most of the competitors were located in other states
with different workers' compensation laws.
Since employers potentially experienced higher productivity gains from
providing workers relatively generous fringe benefits, some employers
might have lobbied for higher benefit levels if they in turn led to higher
productivity and profits. These employers were likely to be in industries
with higher product prices, higher profit margins, or in industries where
greater worker effort and reduced turnover had more of an effect on pro-
ductivity.
Theoretically, employers generally tended to oppose changes in benefit
levels and benefit maximums simply because wages changed. If the focus
was on the benefit level, for example, when setting weekly maximums, the
employers' choice of benefit levels was typically not influenced by the wage
rate because the wage rate does not appear in the premium calculation
above. Thus, both high-wage and low-wage employers would have op-
posed workers' efforts to obtain increases in benefit levels based on argu-
ments that wages had changed)°
7.2.2Factors Influencing the Workers' Choice of Benefit Levels
The workers' choice of optimum benefit levels depended on the balance
between the benefits of higher compensation when they were injured and
any costs they paid for obtaining the higher benefits. Workers clearly bene-180Chapter 7
fited from higher statutory benefit levels because this would have increased
their payments if they were injured. Yet savvy workers could have antici-
pated that the higher benefits would come at some cost because employers
were able to pass on at least part of their insurance costs related to higher
benefits to nonunion workers through wage reductions. The wage offsets
meant that workers were essentially paying for at least part of any increase
in workers' compensation benefits and the "price" they paid was deter-
mined by the size of the premiums employers paid for workers' compensa-
tion coverage and the extent of the wage offset.
Economic analysis of the workers' optimal choice of benefits suggests
that the level of benefits that they sought was determined by their wages,
the dangers of their job, and a variety of factors influencing the insurance
premiums paid by employers for workers' compensation coverage.'1 Work-
ers with higher wages tended to demand higher benefit levels in settings
where the weekly maximum was the focal issue. In economic terms benefit
levels might be described as a normal good since workers with more in-
come could "afford" to pay the costs associated with higher benefit levels.
12
It is not clear whether workers in more dangerous jobs were more likely
to demand higher benefit levels. If there were no wage offsets, these work-
ers would clearly have sought higher benefit levels because they were more
likely to face situations in which they were injured. On the other hand, the
presence of the wage offsets meant that workers in more dangerous jobs
would share in paying the higher premiums required to help pay for the
higher benefits. Thus, workers in more dangerous jobs had to balance both
the gains and losses from higher benefits and would not necessarily de-
mand higher benefit levels.
The presence of wage offsets also meant that factors that might influ-
ence the employers' insurance premiums would influence the workers'
optimal choice of benefits. Increases in the workers' share of the premi-
ums through wage offsets would have tempered workers' efforts to secure
higher benefit levels. Higher insurance loads raised the insurance premi-
ums, which in turn would have caused workers to seek lower benefit levels
to lower their implicit share of the premium costs. The extent of experi-
ence rating also influenced workers' choices. If the premiums were not
experience rated very accurately, then the premiums paid for more danger-
ous workplaces would be subsidized by the premiums paid by employers
for less dangerous workplaces. In these cases, workers in more dangerous
workplaces might seek higher benefit levels because the insurance premi-
ums would not fully reflect the greater danger and thus the worker and
the employer would not fully pay the cost of raising the benefit levels.
Table 7.2 compares how workers' and employers' benefit level choices
would have been affected by the various economic factors discussed above.
Increases in insurance load factors and more accurate experience rating
would have caused both workers and employers to reduce the benefit levelsChanges in the Optimal Level of
Benefits with Respect to Increase in
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Table 7.2 How Economic Factors Influenced the Employers' and Workers'
Demands for Benefit Levels
Employer Worker
Workers' implicit share of insurance
costs (extent of wage offset) Increase Decrease
Accident rate Decrease Increase or decrease
Experience rating of premiums Decrease Decrease
Insurance load factor Decrease Decrease
Waged No effect Increase
Product price Increase -
Number of workers Increase or decrease
Labor productivity Increase
Source: Fishback and Kantor (1998b, 115).
Notes: Dashes imply no prediction. These predictions are derived from economic models of
the benefit decisions for workers and employers. The full derivations are reported in Fishback
and Kantor (1998b, app. A). The predictions above assume that both workers and employers
share in paying the workers' compensation insurance premium, which implies a partial wage
offset. When the worker completely pays the insurance premium in the presence of a full
wage offset, the accident rate and the insurance load would have no impact on the employers'
choice of benefit levels. When the employer pays the full insurance premium because there
is no wage offset, the workers would demand higher benefits when the accident rate rises,
but none of the other factors would affect their choice of benefit levels.
aThis is the prediction when employers and workers are choosing levels of benefits. If they are
choosing the replacement percentage of wages, the employer will seek lower benefit percent-
ages when the wage rate increases, while workers might seek higher or lower benefit per-
centages.
they sought. There are three types of changes, however, that might have
led workers and employers to seek conflicting changes in benefit levels.
First, increases in wages would have led workers to demand higher benefit
levels, while employers would have sought no changes in benefit levels.
Thus, the absence of any effect on benefit levels when wages changed
might have been a signal that employers had significant influence over the
benefit-setting process in state legislatures. Second, in areas where there
was more inherent danger, high-risk employers would have pressed for
lower benefit levels, while workers in high-risk industries might have
sought either lower or higher benefit levels. Finally, when the wage offset
increased, causing workers to pay a larger implicit share of the workers'
compensation insurance premiums, employers would have allowed higher
benefit levels while workers would have sought lower benefit levels, hold-
ing other factors constant.
7.2.3Potential Legislative Outcomes
While groups of workers and employers lobbied for their optimal benefit
levels, state legislators made the final decision subject to the governor's
veto. As in the other chapters, we suggest that legislators chose benefits182Chapter 7
using a political calculus in which they maximized their own objectives,
subject to pressures from the electorate and from competing economic
and political interest groups. Employers and workers were able to exert
influence on the legislators' choices based on their relative strength in the
political arena. Employers' political strength was derived largely from
their ability to organize effectively, which enabled them to apply political
pressure on legislators, provide legislators with relevant information on
the issue, and offer reelection contributions and support. On the other
hand, their large numbers gave workers political strength because they
were the vast majority of the electorate. Such strength was more effectively
wielded when there was a strong union presence that could organize the
workers' lobbying efforts. Workers' efforts were boosted further in states
where there was a strong progressive reform movement, as shown in the
previous chapter's analysis of state insurance funds. Once workers' com-
pensation had been enacted, bureaucratic agencies established to adminis-
ter the law potentially influenced benefit levels because they played a ma-
jor role in providing legislators with information about how the system
functioned. The workers' chances of raising benefits or employers' oppor-
tunities to determine benefit levels were enhanced if they could influence
the bureaucratic ageicy administering the law.
Legislators may have responded to the lobbying of workers and employ-
ers in several ways. If legislators' political successes were tied to satisfying
the median voter interested in the workers' compensation issue, then they
were likely to focus on choosing the optimum benefit level from the work-
ers' perspective because workers were far more numerous than employ-
ers.'3 If the key to political success was pleasing interest groups that could
provide significant resources to aid in reelection campaigns, for example,
then legislators may have focused on satisfying the demands of the most
influential interest groups, or at least reaching a middle ground between
those demands and the wishes of median voters. During the early 1900s,
many unions claimed that employers' interests dominated state legisla-
tures, which would have meant that employers' demands would have dom-
inated in legislators' decisionmaking. On the other hand, in states where
organized labor was strong, unionized workers wielded significant politi-
cal power, as unions served as the mechanism that helped workers over-
come the free-rider problem in voicing their political views (Olson 1965).
7.3Lessons from a Quantitative Analysis of
Workers' Compensation Benefit Levels
What specifically motivated legislators' choices is an empirical question.
We examined how various political economic factors influenced the large
variation in workers' compensation benefit levels across states and time.
In our regression analysis we simultaneously examined how states' benefitThe Battles over Benefit Levels, 1910-1930 183
levels were affected by such factors as the extent of union strength, average
accident risk, the extent of wage offsets, firm size, manufacturing produc-
tivity, broad-based political coalitions, and the workers' compensation bu-
reaucracy. We also controlled for the influence of events associated with
specific years that would have affected all states in the same way, as well
as the influence of specific features of each state that did not change over
time. The quantitative results are reported in further detail in appendix K
and in Fishback and Kantor (1998b).'4
The statistical findings suggest that the legislatures heeded the demands
of both employers and workers. While workers had an advantage because
they accounted for a larger share of the voters in elections, employers still
wielded significant political clout in the legislatures through their orga-
nized lobbying efforts and their financial support of legislators in elections.
Workers were more successful at raising benefits in states where organized
labor was stronger and thus could come closer to matching the concerted
lobbying efforts of employers. Benefit levels were higher, ceteris paribus,
in states with greater unionization, where political upheaval led to shifts
in party control of the state legislature, and where bureaucracies, as op-
posed to the courts, administered the workers' compensation system.
One sign that state legislatures responded to the demands of high-
accident-risk employers is that benefits were lower in states where more
workers were employed in dangerous industries. Employers in those indus-
tries preferred lower benefit levels, while their workers might have chosen
either higher or lower benefits. Both measures of accident risk led to eco-
nomically significant reductions in benefit levels. A 10 percent increase in
average accident risk in manufacturing was associated with roughly a 5
percent reduction in benefit levels. Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase
in the percentage of workers in mining, one of the most dangerous indus-
tries during this time period, was associated with a 2.4 percent decline in
benefit levels.'5
Another sign that legislators were attentive to the demands of employers
is the absence of a strong positive effect of higher wages on benefit levels.
When wages were higher, workers generally would have demanded higher
benefit levels. Meanwhile, optimizing employers had incentives to oppose
raising benefit levels in response to higher wages.'6 The quantitative analy-
sis could not reject the hypothesis that benefit levels were unaffected by
changes in wages. Thus, employers appear to have been successful in lim-
iting the benefit increases that workers sought simply because their
wages rose.
We anticipated that firms with more employees, that received higher
product prices, or that had higher labor productivity would have been
more likely to support higher benefits. When we tested these relationships,
however, we could not reject the hypothesis of no effect. The results cast
some doubt on the notion that larger and more productive firms could184Chapter 7
have used higher workers' compensation benefits to gain a product market
advantage over their smaller and less-productive competitors.
Benefit levels received a relatively strong boost from the presence of
stronger unions. Workers gained more political clout in areas where or-
ganized labor was relatively stronger. In addition, unionized workers also
had relatively strong incentives to push for higher benefit levels because
they were more effective at preventing wage offsets (see chap. 3). On the
other hand, the lower wage offset meant that employers had an incentive
to lobby for lower benefit levels. The quantitative analysis indicates that
in states dominated by industries where organized labor had a greater na-
tional presence, organized labor was successful in overcoming the pressure
from employers for lower benefit levels. When our union measure rose by
1.0 percent, the benefit levels rose by 0.97 percent.
Legislators often have broader agendas than simply pleasing narrowly
focused economic interest groups. To ensure reelection they also had to
pay at least some attention to the demands of the electorate, which may
have meant balancing workers' compensation issues with other social, po-
litical, or economic issues. Reform movements played a small role in de-
termining the timing of adoption of the law and a larger role in the choice
between private and state insurance (see chaps. 4 and 6). They also played
a role in determining the level of benefits.
Shifts in the party composition of state legislatures had economically
and statistically significant positive effects on benefit levels. Strong politi-
cal reform movements during the Progressive Era often caused the party
composition of state legislatures to shift dramatically around the time of
the introduction of workers' compensation. Thus, during these initial up-
heavals, we might expect to see higher benefits in settings where political
control of the legislature shifted from one party to the other. Further,
when the reformers' opponents attempted to retake the legislature, they
may have competed to obtain the support of the reform-minded sectors
of the electorate by proposing even higher benefits. For example, in the
1914 gubernatorial race in Ohio, Republican gubernatorial candidate
Frank Willis called for higher benefits in his efforts to unseat progressive
Democratic governor James Cox and to lead the Republicans in their ef-
forts to retake control of the legislature from the Democrats.'7 In the quan-
titative analysis a shift in party dominance in at least one branch of the
legislature was associated with a 5.1 percent increase in benefit levels.
Once workers' compensation was adopted, workers appear to have been
joined in the struggle for higher benefits by the bureaucratic agents that
administered the new system. States typically chose to administer their
workers' compensation programs in one of two ways. By 1930, ten states
administered the laws through the courts, with employers and workers
establishing agreements regarding accident compensation subject to the
statutory guidelines and the courts settling disputes. Thirty-eight statesThe Battles over Benefit Levels, 1910-1930 185
administered workers' compensation with a bureaucratic commission,
which directly oversaw the disbursement of accident compensation.18 The
state commissions had the potential to act as advocates for changes in
the workers' compensation laws because they were often a key source of
information for legislators, although their attitudes could have been influ-
enced by either employers or workers. The quantitative analysis shows that
when a state had a workers' compensation bureaucracy in place during
the previous year, the benefit levels were about 7.3 percent higher. Thus,
it appears that workers benefited more than employers from the lobbying
by administrative agencies.
7.4Lessons from Three Case Studies of the
Political Struggle over Benefit Levels
The quantitative analysis highlights the important roles played by work-
ers, employers, and reformers, yet it does not offer a full picture of how
benefits were determined in the political process. Information from cases
studies in Ohio, Missouri, and Minnesota adds more depth to the analysis.
The case studies confirm many of the findings in the quantitative analysis,
while illuminating how workers and employers compromised on their orig-
inal demands. In a number of cases each interest group had to settle inter-
nal disputes regarding their willingness to compromise in choosing the
final benefit levels.
7.4.1Proposed Benefit Levels and the Nature of Compromise
In all three states the benefit levels proposed by employers were clearly
lower than the benefit levels sought by workers. As a result, the legislative
process involved a series of compromises in which various different param-
eters of the workers' compensation law were subject to simultaneous nego-
tiation.
In Ohio when workers' compensation was being discussed in 1911, the
key parameter that distinguished the benefit packages proposed by orga-
nized labor and employer groups was the de jure percentage of workers'
compensation premiums that workers would pay. The Ohio Manufactur-
ers' Association (OMA) actively supported a proposal requiring workers
to pay 25 percent of the insurance premiums to provide workers' compen-
sation benefits. The Ohio State Federation of Labor sponsored an alterna-
tive proposal that called for employers to pay the entire premium. The law
that was enacted struck a compromise between these two positions that
also involved other features of the legislation. Workers were required to
pay only 10 percent of employers' insurance premiums, but in return they
gave up the option of choosing between filing a negligence suit or a work-
ers' compensation claim after an accident occurred. Early in the process
organized labor obtained their key demand that the state, and not private186Chapter 7
companies, insure workers' compensation risk. Although the OMA wor-
ried that paying 90 percent rather than 75 percent of the insurance pre-
mium might have led to the failure of the new law, their fears were unjust-
ified, because within several years employers accepted the entire legal
burden of workers' compensation premiums (Fishback and Kantor 1997,
12, 16-17).
In Minnesota during the 191 Os the legislature made a series of changes
in benefit levels. In each case the benefits proposed by workers exceeded
the benefits proposed by employers. In 1913 when workers' compensation
was enacted, the employers' initial proposal was to pay the same benefits
as in New Jersey, which offered the lowest benefits of any state at the time
(see table 7.1), while requiring workers to pay 20 percent of the insurance
premiums. Organized labor, on the other hand, was adamantly opposed
to paying any of the insurance costs and proposed raising the maximum
weekly death benefits from the employers' proposal often dollars to fifteen
dollars, the number of weeks workers would receive permanent disability
or death benefits from 300 to 333, and the maximum total benefit from
three thousand to five thousand dollars. The final result largely favored
employers. Despite several attempts to improve benefits through amend-
ments in the House and Senate, the legislature essentially followed the
New Jersey low benefit structure. Workers managed to force employers to
pay the entire insurance premiums, but they traded away the option to
choose between negligence suits and workers' compensation claims, as
Ohio workers had.
After both employers and workers in Minnesota agreed to slightly im-
prove benefit levels in the 1915 legislature, they waged a major struggle
over benefits in 1917. Organized labor, with the help of the Department
of Labor and Industries, proposed a substantial increase in the wage re-
placement rate from one-half to two-thirds, a substantial rise in the maxi-
mum weekly benefit, a reduction in the waiting period from two weeks to
one week, and a requirement that employers pay all medical costs. During
the legislative session, labor's representatives in the legislature compro-
mised at a replacement rate of 60 percent, a weekly maximum of twelve
dollars, and a reduction in the waiting period of one week. During the
course of the 1910s, the continued pressure from organized labor raised
benefits from near the bottom of benefits in 1913 to a ranking among
the top quartile of the states with workers' compensation in 1921 (see
table 7.1).
In Missouri, where the battles over the passage of workers' compensa-
tion lasted nearly fifteen years, the gap between the employers' and orga-
nized labor's proposals was often quite large. For example, in 1919 the
labor proposal called for a wage replacement rate of two-thirds along with
no weekly maximum. The bill that passed the 1919 legislature more closely
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fifteen dollars. After voters struck down the 1919 act in a referendum,
organized labor continued to propose substantially higher benefits than
those offered by employers both inside the legislature and in proposals to
be voted on in referenda. Finally, in a 1925 act employers and workers
compromised, the employers allowed relatively high benefits in return for
the elimination of state insurance, and voters approved the law in a 1926
referendum. In the first year of operation in 1927, Missouri's benefits
ranked sixth among the forty-three workers' compensation states (see
table 7.1).
7.4.2Organized Labor's Support in the State Legislatures
In the regression analysis of benefit levels across states and time, we
found that areas where organized labor had more strength tended to have
higher benefit levels. Similarly, studies of roll-call voting within state legis-
latures show that legislators with strong ties to organized labor consis-
tently voted to amend legislation to include higher benefits. Legislators
that could be identified as having strong union ties nearly unanimously
voted in favor of higher benefits. In addition, legislators from districts with
higher unionization rates consistently supported higher benefits.
19
In Ohio in 1911 there was a series of House votes on amendments to the
compromise bill that required workers to pay 10 percent and employers to
pay 90 percent of the workers' compensation insurance premiums. When
the compromise bill reached the House floor on 26 April, Republican rep-
resentative Charles Reid offered an amendment to raise the workers' bur-
den to 20 percent, but it was defeated seventeen to seventy-four, as legisla-
tors who had strong labor ties voted unanimously against the amendment.
The next day progressive representative W. B. Kilpatrick tried the reverse
strategy, calling for an amendment that would have required employers to
pay 100 percent of the premiums. After Speaker of the House Samuel
Vining, at Reid's behest, ruled the amendment out of order because the
issue had already been voted on, Kilpatrick appealed the decision and lost
by a close vote of forty to thirty-eight. Again, legislators with strong labor
ties unanimously voted against the speaker's decision; progressives and
representatives from districts with relatively high accident rates also
tended to vote against the speaker's ruling.20 Kilpatrick then tried again
in the afternoon, moving that the vote on Reid's original amendment be
reconsidered and amending Reid's amendment so that employers would
be required to pay the entire workers' compensation premium. This time
his amendment was voted down thirty-five to seventy.2' Labor representa-
tives again supported this amendment.22
In 1913 the Minnesota House voted on a series of amendments related
to benefits. These included attempts to raise the weekly maximum benefit
payment from $10 to $15, the maximum level of medical benefits from
$100 to $195, and the payment of retroactive benefits to workers after188Chapter 7
thirty days of disability to cover the benefits they had not been paid during
the two-week waiting period. Roll-call analysis of the voting on the each
of these amendments showed that legislators from districts where union
members constituted a greater percentage of the population tended to vote
in favor of the amendments. Although union members accounted for a
relatively small fraction of a representative's total constituency (averaging
1.5 percent), a change of 1.8 percentage points (one standard deviation)
in union membership in a legislator's district would have increased the leg-
islator's probability of voting for the amendments by 20 to 34 percentage
points.23
In Missouri in 1919 the battle over benefits included a roll-call vote in
the House on raising the weekly maximum from eighteen to twenty-one
dollars. The amendment was struck down by a vote of forty-seven to sev-
enty-five. Analysis of the voting shows again that legislators from districts
where union members constituted a larger percentage of the population
strongly supported the measure (Kantor and Fishback 1994a).
7.4.3The Effects of Differences within Interest Groups
In several states there were differences in attitudes within groups about
the proper benefit levels. As discussed in chapter 5, in some states internal
strife within labor groups and employer groups actually led to perverse
effects, delaying the adoption of workers' compensation in Minnesota by
two years and in Missouri by nearly fifteen years.
In Minnesota the internal struggle over the proper parameters of the
law developed early in 1911. The 1909 Employers' Liability Commission
fractured as the organized labor and state bar representatives offered a
majority report while a minority report was written by the employers' rep-
resentative. The division in the commission paled, however, in comparison
with the divisions within the interest groups themselves. The membership
of the Minnesota Employers' Association (MEA) was not willing to sup-
port their own representative's bill because they could not agree on the
proper parameters of the bill (MEA, 14 December 1911). On the labor
side, the labor representative found that his own advisory group of fifty
labor leaders thought the benefits he had proposed were too low. The dis-
agreement within each group stifled effective compromise between the
groups and prevented the adoption of workers' compensation in 1911.
Internal conflicts within organized labor continued as the employers'
proposal, which mimicked the low benefits in New Jersey, worked its way
through the 1913 legislature. The Minnesota State Federation of Labor
(MnSFL) and the St. Paul Trades Assembly were willing to accept the
relatively low benefit levels, as long as they imposed the full de jure cost
of insurance on employers and worker negligence would never bar the
payment of benefits. To establish workers' compensation in 1913, they
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expectation of amending the law in future sessions of the legislature.24 The
low benefits in the proposed bill led some members of the MnSFL, the
railroad brotherhoods, and the Minneapolis Trades and Labor Assembly
(MTLA) to accuse the MnSFL of "selling out the cause of the workers to
their employers." They argued for pushing for higher benefits in the initial
law on the grounds that the law could not be easily amended later.25 To
some extent, the MnSFL's prediction that they would be able to amend
workers' compensation to increase the benefits in later legislatures proved
prescient. Over the next several legislatures they were able to obtain higher
benefits and move from a ranking among the lowest benefit levels in the
nation in 1913 to one among the upper quartile by 1919 (Kantor and
Fishback 1998).
The struggle over the details of workers' compensation legislation that
delayed adoption in Minnesota was minor in comparison to what oc-
curred in Missouri. Missouri was one of the many states to establish a
workers' compensation commission in 1910. However, the failure on the
part of organized labor and of employers to compromise effectively over
the level of benefits, waiting periods, the coverage of occupational dis-
eases, and state insurance led to stalemates in the legislature throughout
the 1910s. By 1917 a divisive split had developed within organized labor.
The Missouri State Federation of Labor (M0SFL) was ready to compro-
mise with employers so that workers could finally receive the benefits of
workers' compensation. They planned to seek amendments to the law
later. The building trades unions, on the other hand, were interested in
securing their desired bill at the time of adoption, on the grounds that
amending the law later would be difficult politically. The divisions within
organized labor delayed the adoption once again in 1917 (Kantor and
Fishback 1994a).
In 1918 the MoSFL and building trades unions came together and pro-
posed a bill for the 1919 legislature that called for relatively generous bene-
fitstwo-thirds of the wage and no maximum weekly benefitand state
insurance. It is clear that legislators focused more fully on the demands
of employers because the bill enacted by the 1919 legislature imposed a
maximum weekly benefit of fifteen dollars per week and eliminated state
insurance. Once again, the MoSFL agreed to the changes, arguing that if
state insurance and high benefits were not politically feasible, then the
goal should be to get the best workers' compensation bill possible and
to seek prolabor amendments in later years. The building trades unions
disagreed, demanding a law with state insurance and high maximum bene-
fits or no law at all. The building trades and some other union elements
then joined damage-suit attorneys in seeking a referendum to strike down
the legislative act. The strategy was successful, as voters rejected the 1919
workers' compensation law by a close 52.2 to 47.8 percent margin.
The intransigence of the building trades continued for several more190Chapter 7
years. In 1921 the MoSFL, the Associated Industries of Missouri (AIM),
and other employer organizations cooperated to pass a new workers' com-
pensation law that added a state fund that would compete with private
insurers and raised the weekly maximum benefit from fifteen to twenty
dollars. The building trades council remained dissatisfied with this com-
promise and again joined the damage-suit lawyers in forcing a referendum
that struck the act down. In 1923 the legislature could come to no compro-
mise, freeing organized labor to place their dream initiative with state in-
surance and high weekly maximums of thirty dollars on the ballot. The
initiative's resounding defeat at the po11s finally convinced the building
trades that compromise was necessary. In 1925 the legislature passed an-
other workers' compensation law, which was approved in a 1926 referen-
dum, that eliminated state insurance but gave Missouri workers their rela-
tively generous benefits.
7.4.4The Significance of Political Institutions
The case histories also show how the original proposals were altered
and shaped into legislation by the political process. The interest groups
tried to frame the debates over their proposals, but the debates were often
reframed as the proposals moved from the employers' liability commis-
sions through the House, the Senate, the governor's office, and even voter
referenda. Since at each stage the relative political strength of labor and
employers varied, proposals that carried the day in the House might face
severe problems in passing the Senate, while the compromises struck in
the legislature might not satisfy the electorate. The case studies, therefore,
show the importance of veto power at each stage of the political process
in shaping the ultimate form of workers' compensation laws. The impor-
tance of this veto power is also illustrated by the party shift coefficients in
the quantitative analysis. A party shift in one house of the legislature
raised benefit levels to some degree by reframing the debate in the other
house, but the benefit levels rose still higher when the party shift occurred
in both houses of the legislature.
In Ohio a key event that shaped the final law occurred in 1911 when
labor leader and Senate president pro-tem William Green rammed a mod-
ified version of the labor proposal through the Senate. The Senate action
established a benchmark for further discussion but was not decisive. Gov-
ernor Harmon, who was less progressive than the legislature, immediately
announced that he would veto the labor version of the bill, and then
worked with House members to develop a compromise that eventually
was enacted (Fishback and Kantor 1997, 12-17).
In Minnesota in 1913 and again in 1915 the veto power of one house of
the legislature is effectively illustrated by the struggles over the waiting
period before benefits would be paid. In both years the House passed bills
that called for shorter waiting periods than those proposed in bills passedThe Battles over Benefit Levels, 1910-1930 191
by the Senate. The bills then went to conference committee where the Sen-
ate's rejection of the shorter waiting period stood.26
Missouri's experience offers a final example of the impact of veto power
by the voters in referenda. In 1919 the Missouri House passed a bill with
a weekly maximum of eighteen dollars, which also included a state insur-
ance provision. The Senate then lowered the maximum to fifteen dollars
and eliminated state insurance. As described above, the interest groups dis-
satisfied with the legislation, albeit for different reasons, forced a voter refer-
endum that vetoed the legislation. Once the potential for a veto by referen-
dum was established, more strategic behavior was practiced in legislative
deliberations. In 1921 a state insurance fund to compete with private in-
surers was added by floor amendment at the last minute. The amendment
was widely supported by opponents of workers' compensation as a means
of ensuring the law's defeat at the po11s (Kantor and Fishback 1 994a,
288-91).
7.5Summary
The general concept of workers' compensation included a range of ben-
efits under which both employers and workers could benefit. Yet, adjust-
ments of benefit levels within that range could lead to a significant redistri-
bution of the gains available from enacting the legislation. Thus, even
though employers and workers might have gained with any benefit level
within the range when compared to the status quo, significant disputes
erupted as both employers and workers sought to increase their share of
the gains from passing the law. The disputes ultimately were settled by
state legislators.
The state legislators paid substantial attention to the demands of several
interest groups. Employers in high-risk industries succeeded in pressuring
legislatures to keep benefit levels low. Further, they succeeded in convinc-
ing legislatures to hold the line on benefits despite wage increases. The em-
ployers' push for low benefits was tempered in areas where organized labor
was strong. In states with a greater share of manufacturing employment
in unionized industries, benefits were substantially higher. Furthermore,
once agencies were established to administer workers' compensation, or-
ganized labor succeeded in enlisting the efforts of state administrators to
help raise benefit levels in the years after workers' compensation was
adopted.
Another key factor in determining benefit levels was the presence of
political reform movements, like that oi the progressives, within state legis-
latures. Political power shifts, as measured by shifts in the party domi-
nance of state legislatures, played a stronger role in the determination of
benefit levels than they did in the adoption of workers' compensation
more generally. In chapter 6 we find a similar result when examining the192Chapter 7
struggles over state insurance. We believe the reason is that all sides ex-
pected to benefit from the adoption of workers' compensation, but their
interests differed on the issue of benefit levels. Employers typically op-
posed high benefits, but in states where political reformers forged a coali-
tion with organized labor, the benefit levels were higher and relatively radi-
cal features such as state insurance were more likely to have been included
in the workers' compensation law.
Case histories offer several additional insights into the determination of
benefit levels. They confirm that workers initially proposed higher bene-
fits than employers were willing to offer. Organized labor and employers
played important roles in framing the debates over benefit levels, which
involved a range of parameters including the wage replacement percent-
age, the weekly maximums, waiting periods, and the de jure share of the
insurance premiums paid by employers. The case studies show that the leg-
islative compromises over benefit levels often involved adjustments along
these different margins. In Ohio and Minnesota, for example, employers
increased their de jure share of the cost of insurance premiums to ensure
that workers did not retain their rights to sue under negligence liability.
Finally, the studies of Minnesota and Missouri show that the struggle over
benefits could sometimes lead to perverse results. Even though employers
and workers both anticipated gains from workers' compensation, their
struggle to increase their share of the gains through adjustments in benefit
levels actually led to delays in the adoption of workers' compensation by
two years in Minnesota and nearly a decade in Missouri.
Notes
Stroud's argument was printed in a letter to the editor of the Birmingham
News under "Manufacturers on Compensation Act," 9 February 1919, 6. Senator
Leeth's statement appeared in "Senator Leeth Explains Why Compensation Bill
Was Delayed," Labor Advocate, 8 March 1919, 1.
We also used the national average wage, as opposed to each state's specific
wage, to avoid a spurious positive relationship between wages and benefits in the
quantitative analysis that we summarize later in the chapter and in appendix K.
In nearly all states employers were required by statute to pay all of the insur-
ance premiums required to provide the workers' compensation benefits. However,
the issue of whether workers would share in paying the premiums was actively
discussed in some states. In the initial Ohio law workers were required to pay a
share of the premium, which in essence reduced their expected benefits from the
law. We have adjusted the expected benefits in Ohio downward.
The employer might pay these premiums to a separate insurer, either private
or state, or he might self-insure and just pay out the workers' compensation premi-
ums directly.
The exceptions were Ohio and Oregon just after they passed workers' com-
pensation. Both states joined the remaining states in forcing employers to pay 100The Battles over Benefit Levels, 1910-1930193
percent of the workers' compensation insurance premiums within a few years of
their initial passage.
The employer's demand for workers' compensation benefit levels can be de-
rived from the maximization of the following profit function:
A(C) = RQ(zL,C) - WL - (1 - k)e(1 + h)pCL,
where L is the number of workers employed, R is the product price, z is a labor
productivity parameter, and Q(zL, C) is output, which rises at a diminishing rate
with increases in labor and benefits (QL' Q> 0; Q' Q < 0). We assume that
the derivative of the marginal product of labor with respect to benefit levels is
positive (Q> 0). Generally, efficiency-wage models predict that improvements
in workers' nonwage benefits can lead to greater labor productivity. Further, in-
creased compensation when injured would allow workers more freedom to in-
crease productivity because the worker's net loss from an accident is reduced. The
representative employer would then choose C to satisfy the first-order condition
for a maximum:
(2) = RQ - ep(1 - k)(1 + h)L = 0,
leading to the following demand function for benefit levels:
= C(R, z,e, p, k, h, L).
When there is less than a full wage offset, an employer would seek higher benefit
levels in settings where the wage offset (k) is higher, in industries where the accident
rate (p) is lower, there is less experience rating (e is lower), insurance loads (h) are
lower, the product price (R) is higher, and labor productivity (z) is higher. The
employer's choice of the optimal benefit level will be the same whether wages rise
or fall. In other words, the employer's optimal benefit level is independent of the
wage, as the first-order condition suggests. A discussion of the derivation of these
results and how they might be influenced by other assumptions can be found in
Fishback and Kantor (1998b).
In a world where there were no information costs or costs of administering
insurance, the insurance premium would have been "actuarially fair." An actuari-
ally fair premium is equal to the benefits paid when an accident occurs multiplied
by the probability the accident would occur. Given the administrative costs of sell-
ing insurance, companies would then add a load factor into the premium to cover
their administrative costs. Load factors were sometimes included to reduce prob-
lems associated with adverse selection, which arise because insurance companies
cannot always tell the difference between customers with high risks and those with
low risks. Without such information, if they set the premiums based on the average
risk, only high-risk customers will buy, and the insurance companies will lose
money. By setting the premiums higher, under some conditions the insurance com-
pany can make money selling insurance to the high-risk customers even though
they sell no insurance to the low-risk customers.
Experience rating is important because incomplete experience rating offers
high-risk groups the opportunity to obtain subsidies from low-risk groups.
Baicker, Goldin, and Katz (1998) view problems with experience rating as a central
factor in explaining the introduction of unemployment insurance in the United
States in the 1930s.
Workers' compensation appears to have been more fully experience rated than
unemployment insurance later became, in part because private insurers played a
much larger role in determining workers' compensation insurance premiums.
McCahan (1929, 100-118) suggests that private insurers were relatively effective at
experience rating across industries because they pooled information through the194Chapter 7
National Council on Compensation Insurance. He suggests that state funds had
less success at experience rating, although many state funds tried to experience
rate across industries by maintaining separate funds for each industry grouping.
10. On the other hand, in situations where benefits were set as a percentage of
the wage, that is, the maximums were not binding, the wage rate played a role in
determining the benefit level. Consequently, higher-wage employers tended to
press for lower benefit percentages to reduce their insurance premiums. Workers'
compensation benefits can be discussed in terms of the level of benefits or in terms
of replacing a percentage of the wage. We focus much of the discussion on benefit
levels here because a large share of the battles fought were over the maximum
weekly payment to workers. Generally, our discussions of how the choice of bene-
fits is influenced by the dangers of the job, load factors, productivity, wage offsets,
and so on are the same whether we focus on benefits as levels or as percentages of
the wage. The prediction of how wage rates would influence benefits is the only
predicted effect to differ. For further discussion, see Fishback and Kantor (1998b,
app. A).
II. The optimal benefit levels from the standpoint of the individual worker can
be determined by examining the maximization of the following expected utility
function:
E(C) =(I - p)U[W - ek(l+h)pC]+pV(C),
where p (0 is the probability that the disabling accident would occur. The
worker's net income if he remains uninjured is the term [W - ek( I+h) p C], where
W is the workers' annual wage not accounting for any potential wage offset from
employer-provided accident insurance, k is the share of the cost of the benefits
that workers pay through wage offsets (0 I), e is the extent to which insur-
ance premiums are experience rated to reflect industrial differences in accident
risk (e<I implies that the worker's industry was subsidized by other industries),
h is the insurance load factor, which reflects administrative costs, including the
monitoring costs associated with moral hazard problems, and pC represents the
actuarially fair insurance premium that would provide C dollars worth of benefits
in case of injury. U is the worker's utility of income with no accident and V is the
utility function in the disabled state. U' and V' are positive and U" and V" are nega-
tive, implying risk aversion.
The worker chooses C to maximize his expected utility and the first-order condi-
tion for a maximum, derived from the equation above, is
E = V'(C) -ek(l - p)(l+h)U'[W - ek(l+h)pC]=0.
Using the first-order condition we can derive the representative worker's optimal
choice of benefits
C=C(e, k, p, h, W).
The comparative statics from the maximization problem imply that the worker
would seek higher benefits at higher wages (W), when the wage offset (k) was
lower, when the insurance load factor (h) was lower, and when workers' compensa-
tion premiums were less experience rated (e). The impact of changes in accident
risk on the worker's benefit choice is uncertain. On the one hand, higher accident
risk raises the worker's demand for higher benefits because the accident state of
the world is more likely; on the other hand, if there is a wage offset the cost of the
insurance to the worker also rises with the increase in accident risk. For a descrip-
tion of how these results were derived, see Fishback and Kantor (1998b, app. A).
12. In situations where workers were lobbying not for levels but for replacementThe Battles over Benefit Levels, l9l0-l930 195
percentages, a higher wage did not necessarily cause workers to demand higher
benefit percentages because their benefit levels were already tied directly to the
wage rate by the replacement percentage.
Danzon (1988) used a median voter model to examine modern workers' com-
pensation benefit levels. While offering some useful insights, it is only one model
that can be used to explain legislative behavior. There is a variety of qualitative
and quantitative evidence that state legislators paid attention to the pressures from
interest groups and to political coalitions within the legislature. Employers, insur-
ance companies, and organized labor had a much greater influence within state
legislatures than their voting numbers would suggest. Many of these interest
groups offered funds or personnel for reelection campaigns, framed the legislative
debates for legislators, flooded hearings with lobbyists, and often served as key
sources of information in an era when legislators did not have large staffs to con-
duct research or write legislation.
See also Fishback and Kantor (1998b).
Another factor that potentially influenced the mining coefficient was the size
of the wage offset. As argued in chapter 3, nonunion coal miners experienced a
full wage offset, but unionized miners experienced close to no wage offset. Since
the mining variable includes both union and nonunion workers, the workers aggre-
gated in the measure did not experience a full wage offset. Under this condition,
employers in mining would demand lower benefits because workers were paying
less of the benefits through lower wages (see table 7.2).
The employer's choice of benefit levels was unaffected by the wage in the
theoretical model. This does not imply that the employer was indifferent to
changes in benefit levels that were caused by wage changes. Instead, his optimal
benefit choice was the same whether the wage was high or low; therefore, the em-
ployer would have been opposed to changes in the benefit level that were driven
only by wage changes, holding other relevant determinants constant. When the
focus was on benefit percentages as opposed to levels, employers tended to want
lower benefit percentages as wages rose.
Ohio State Federation of Labor (191 5a, 25-27). Cox charged that Willis was
hostile to workers' compensation. Willis always strongly denied this. While run-
ning for reelection in 1916, Willis stated that not one line of the law had been
changed during his administration, and that he had sought higher benefits but
both labor and capital stated that the time was not yet right (Ridinger 1957,
103-5).
Wyoming administered the law through the courts but had a monopoly state
insurance fund, so we have treated it in the regression analyses as having an admin-
istrative body
See the analysis in Fishback and Kantor (1997, 15-17) of roll-call votes in
the Ohio House of Representatives on 26 April 1911 on an amendment to raise
the workers' insurance cost burden to 20 percent from 10 percent, on a House
Speaker ruling that an amendment requiring employers to pay 100 percent of in-
surance premiums was out of order, and then a direct vote on an amendment to
force employers to pay 100 percent of insurance premiums. For Minnesota see the
discussion in Kantor and Fishback (1998) of the battle in the House over a series
of amendments proposed by Representative Lundeen in April 1913 and of House
votes on a reduction in the waiting period in 1915. For Missouri, see the analysis
in Kantor and Fishback (1994a, 282-90) of four referenda and of a 1919 House
amendment to raise the weekly maximum to twenty-one dollars.
The labor group voted unanimously against the speaker and for Kilpatrick's
amendment. Among progressives 68.4 percent voted against the speaker, while
only 27 percent of nonprogressives voted against him. We gathered information196Chapter 7
on the amount awarded in workers' compensation claims in Ohio from 1 January
1914 to 30 June 1915, as reported by the Ohio Industrial Commission (1916, 64-
118), and divided by the adult male population in 1910 to get a sense of the extent
of workplace injury problems in each county. Of representatives from counties
where per capita injury payments were higher than the mean, 61 percent voted
against the speaker in favor of Kilpatrick, while only 33.2 percent of the represen-
tatives from counties below the mean voted against the speaker.
See also Ohio House of Representatives Journal (1911, 846-52); Cleveland
Plain Dealer, 28 April 1911; Ohio State Journal, 28 April 1911; Toledo News-Bee,
28 April 1911.
Although organized labor supported the amendment, the earlier support of
progressives, Democrats, and representatives from high-injury areas evaporated.
It is clear that their earlier support was based on the procedural issue involved,
not the desire to force employers to pay a greater share of the de jure costs of
workers' compensation insurance. A regression analysis of the voting revealed no
sign of statistically significant support from progressives, Democrats, or represen-
tatives from counties that had relatively high accident risk. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the probability of being a labor representative raised the
probability of voting in favor of the amendment by a statistically significant 12.6
percentage points. Legislators who were farmers also supported labor's amend-
ment. A one-standard-deviation increase in the probability of being a farmer
raised support by a statistically significant 11 percentage points. The results from
this roll-call analysis are available from the authors. See also Ohio House of Repre-
sentatives Journal(191 1,846-52); Cleveland Plain Dealer, 28 April 1911; Ohio State
Journal, 28 April 1911; and Toledo News-Bee, 28 April 1911.
The roll-call analysis involved estimating a probit of the legislators' vote on
the issue while controlling for membership in key legislative committees, whether
the legislator was a Democrat, the legislator's occupation, the percentage of the
population in unions, the percentage in manufacturing, and agricultural output
per person in the district. The roll-call votes were from the Minnesota House of
Representatives Journal (1913, 1623-29). Committee memberships and occupa-
tions are from Minnesota Secretary of State (1913, 146-47, 151-53). Union mem-
bership is from Minnesota Department of Labor and Industries (l9l3-l9l4, 229).
Agricultural output, population, and manufacturing employment data were ob-
tained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR) census tapes for 1910 and 1920.
See Minneapolis Labor Review, 14 March 1913; Lawson (1955, 217); Labor
World, 19 April 1913; and MnSFL (1913, 36-37). The Minneapolis Journal, 10
April 1913, made the same plea to its readers: "[P]ass the bill and get the system
started. It can be perfected better after it is in operation than by laying aside the
whole matter for another two years, while the extremists on both sides quarrel
about terms."
See MEA, 14 March 1913; Labor World, 15 March 1915; and Minneapolis
Labor Review, 11 and 18 April 1913. The railroad brotherhoods were concerned
that the new law would preempt their rights under the Federal Employers' Liability
Acts of 1906 and 1908.
In 1913 the Senate and the House also chose different maximums for medical
expenses, one hundred and two hundred dollars, respectively. They struck a com-
promise in conference committee that imposed an initial maximum of one hundred
dollars but allowed the courts to order an additional one hundred dollars of ben-
efits.